1 IN THE MATTER OF: Law Enforcement Review Act 2 Complaint No. 2009/137 3 4) Ms. N. A. BETWEEN: agent for the Complainant 5) A.A.,) 6 7) Mr. M. Stonyk 8 Complainant, for the Commissioner) 9 - and -) 10) Mr. P. McKenna 11) for the Winnipeg Police CONSTABLE G.G., 12 Respondent.) Association 13) 14) Judgment delivered 15 January 21, 2010) 16 17 18 LERNER, P.J. (Orally) 19 The complainant in this matter has filed a 20 written complaint, which was received by the LERA 21 commissioner on June the 23rd of 2009. The complainant 22 alleges a disciplinary default on the part of the 23 respondent as a result of a breach of section 29(g) of The 24 Law Enforcement Review Act, specifically, a violation of 25 privacy within the meaning of The Privacy Act. The 26 complainant identifies the person affected by the alleged disciplinary default as being her son, A. 27 28 Without reciting all of the background details of 29 the complaint, from the material filed it appears that the 30 complainant's son was the subject of a sentencing order, 31 that being a nine month conditional discharge granted by 32 Judge Chartier of this court pursuant to the provisions of 33 The Youth Criminal Justice Act on April 9, 2009. The 34 substance of the complainant's complaint is that a copy of Reviewed - Release authorized by Lerner, P.J.

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this court document was disclosed to school officials at 1 Grant Park High School, Kelvin High School and/or the 2 3 Winnipeg School Division and that she, quote, speculates 4 that the disclosure was made by the respondent officer, Constable G. G., who, from the material filed, appears to 5 be a Winnipeg Police Service school resource or community 6 7 officer. The complainant alleges that the disclosure of 8 this information breached the provisions of The Privacy Act 9 and thereby constitutes a disciplinary default on the part 10 of the respondent officer.

11 I will begin by noting that notwithstanding Ms. 12 A.'s speculation to the contrary, investigation by the Law 13 Enforcement Review Agency's investigator, which 14 investigation was relied by the commissioner, upon 15 disclosed that the copy of the court order in question was 16 provided to the vice principal of Kelvin High School by one 17 of the parents of the three youths who were named in the 18 court order. The three youths in question were individuals 19 who the complainant's son was not to contact or communicate with during the duration of the order. 20

21 As noted by the commissioner in his decision, 22 there is no evidence to support the complainant's 23 speculation that the document in question was disclosed to school division officials by the respondent 24 school or To the contrary, the evidence obtained by the 25 officer. 26 LERA investigator was that the document was disclosed by 27 someone other than the respondent.

Section 119(1)(d) and (g) of The Youth Criminal Justice Act provides that a victim of an offence shall, upon request, be given access to an order of this type under certain circumstances and the same applies to access by a peace officer. Section 125(6) of the same Youth Criminal Justice Act authorizes a peace officer to disclose any information contained in a Youth Criminal Justice Act

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[2]

record to a person engaged in the care of a young person, 1 2 which would include a parent, or a representative of any 3 school or school division. Any information contained in an 4 order of this nature is to ensure the safety of staff, 5 students or other persons to facilitate the or rehabilitation of the young person who is the subject of 6 7 this order.

8 In this case, as noted, the conditional discharge 9 order discloses that the order was made as against the 10 complainant's son following a sentence being imposed upon 11 him and this was following a finding of guilt, apparently, 12 with respect to the offence of assault with a weapon.

As noted, after an investigation in this case, the commissioner found that the order in question was not disclosed by the respondent officer. He went on to observe that even had the officer disclosed the noted order, he would have had lawful authority to do so for the reasons that I have identified in terms of the various provisions of The Youth Criminal Justice Act.

20 The commissioner concluded that the subject 21 matter of the complaint did not fall within the scope of 22 section 29 of The Law Enforcement Review Act, in that the 23 act of disclosure apparently was not performed by the 24 That appears to be the thrust and substance of officer. 25 the commissioner's decision. I will talk more about that 26 in a moment.

27 As a result, in a letter dated July 27th, 2009 the commissioner declined, pursuant to section 13(1)(a) of 28 the Act, to take further action on the complaint made by 29 30 the complainant on behalf of her son. The complainant has now, of course, asked a provincial court judge to review 31 32 the decision of the commissioner and in this case, The Law 33 Enforcement Review Act codifies and governs the process in 34 The Act specifies that the burden is on the this case.

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1 complainant to satisfy the judge that the commissioner has 2 made a mistake and declined it to take any further action, 3 in other words, in declining to order a hearing before a 4 judge.

5 The law in the area of judicial review has quite recently been clarified by the Supreme Court of Canada in 6 7 the Dunsmuir decision, 2008, SCJ, number 9. The decision 8 governs how this type of review must proceed and clarifies 9 the test to be applied in this type of review. There are The first is correctness. 10 two standards of review. The 11 standard of correctness applies only if the commissioner 12 has committed an identifiable jurisdictional error. And by jurisdictional error I mean that the commissioner has 13 14 failed to act within the parameters of his jurisdiction by 15 either applying a wrong test or misapplying a right test 16 when coming to a decision.

17 If an issue as to jurisdictional error arises I have to determine whether the commissioner's decision with 18 19 respect to the jurisdictional issue was the correct one. In this case, as I explained to counsel for the respondent 20 and the commissioner, I had some concern as to whether 21 22 there was a jurisdictional error. Notwithstanding the 23 finding of the commissioner, it is clear to me that the 24 subject matter of this complaint would fall within the 25 scope of section 29 if there had been a breach of privacy 26 contrary to The Privacy Act.

27 Α conclusion that the subject matter of а complaint does not fall within the scope of section 28 29 would be available, for example, if the subject matter of 29 30 the complaint did not fall within one of the enumerated 31 categories in section 29, for example, if the respondent 32 was alleged to have done something outside the scope of his 33 duties in the course of -- something unrelated to his 34 duties as a police officer. And that is not the case here.

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1 But Ι also as suggested to counsel, 2 notwithstanding the language used by the commissioner, it 3 is abundantly clear that what the commissioner has actually 4 and effectively found is that there is insufficient evidence that the respondent has committed the default 5 alleged, in other words, has found, effectively, that there 6 7 is no evidence that the officer respondent has committed 8 the default alleged. And I am going to proceed with my 9 analysis on that basis as that appears to be the thrust and substance of the commissioner's decision here. 10 11 Accordingly, Ι find that there is no

Accordingly, I find that there is no jurisdictional error in this case, based upon the decision that the commissioner has effectively reached and I will proceed with my analysis on the standard of reasonableness.

15 The Supreme Court of Canada, in <u>Dunsmuir</u>, defined 16 reasonableness in the following way:

18 "In judicial review reasonableness 19 concerned mostly with is the 20 of existence justification, 21 and intelligibility transparency 22 within the decision-making process 23 it is also concerned with but 24 whether the decision falls within 25 range of possible acceptable а 26 outcomes which are defensible in 27 respect of the facts in the law."

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In November of 2008 my brother Judge Preston ruled on this issue in the decision of LERA complaint number 2005-186 where he stated the following:

"The question to be answered is

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1	this: did the commissioner assess
2	the evidence reasonably. In other
3	words, have the commissioner's
4	reasons been transparently,
5	intelligently and rationally
6	articulated. My function is to
7	see if the commissioner has made a
8	reasonable assessment of the
9	evidence. In other words, I must
10	examine whether the commissioner
11	drew a rational conclusion, one
12	that could be reasonably be drawn
13	on the facts of this case."
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15	As also noted by Preston, P.J. in that decision:
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17	"The LERA commissioner does
18	possess a limited but significant
19	power to waive the evidence
20	gathered during the course of the
21	LERA investigation. The Law
22	Enforcement Review Act mandates
23	the commissioner to weigh all the
24	evidence and to draw a conclusion
25	on its sufficiency. This includes
26	the weighing of disputed evidence
27	in order to determine its
28	efficiency. If that were not the
29	case, each time there was a
30	contradiction on any fact in issue
31	the matter would have to proceed
32	to hearing before a provincial
33	judge."
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1 I have reviewed the LERA investigation file and 2 the commissioner's reasons for declining to take further 3 action on the complaint. As noted, the LERA investigator 4 in this case, upon whose investigation the commissioner interviewed witnesses and determined 5 relied, that the document in question, the court order, was not disclosed to 6 7 school officials by Constable G. but rather by a parent of 8 one of the children named in the order.

9 I do accept that there is no evidence that a request had been made of the court for release of the noted 10 document. As a result, I need not admit the quote unquote 11 12 new evidence on this point that the complainant proposed to In my view, this is not new file at this proceeding. 13 14 evidence. In fact, I am proceeding on the basis that there 15 was no evidence of such a request for disclosure of the 16 document in question and that, in fact, it was the basis 17 upon which the commissioner appears to have proceeded. So 18 there was no basis upon which, in my view, that further 19 document needs to be provided. It is something that was before the commissioner effectively when he reached his 20 21 decision.

22 But I don't find that the absence of a request of 23 the court for the release of the document in question, that 24 is, the sentencing order with respect to the complainant's 25 son, renders the commissioner's decision unreasonable. 26 Clearly the document was released by someone, whether or 27 not there was a record of same. As noted, there were a lawful ways in which it could have been 28 variety of The threshold issue that the commissioner was to 29 released. 30 decide was whether it was Constable G. who was responsible 31 for release of same.

I have concluded that based on a reasonable investigation, the commissioner assessed the evidence reasonably and drew a rational conclusion on the merits of

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1 the complainant's complaint. It may not have been the only 2 conclusion to have been reached in this case but it was certainly an available and rational conclusion. 3 The 4 commissioner's had reasons been transparently, intelligently and rationally articulated. 5

6 I therefore conclude that the commissioner did 7 not commit an error within the meaning of section 13 of the Act and that therefore, there is no basis upon which this 8 9 court can interfere with the decision of the commissioner in that regard. That then is the decision of the court 10 11 with respect to this matter. And, of course, the ban on 12 publication with respect to the respondent's name will 13 continue.

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